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1. Introduction
Since the empirical paper of Aschauer (1989) and Munell (1990), many works have focused
on the positive incidence of public investment on growth and welfare. From a theoretical
point of view, Barro (1990) was an important breakpoint on that subject, considering an
endogenous growth framework with public capital.1 Among many others, Futagami et al.
(1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Cassou and Lasing (1998,1999) and Turnovsky
(1996, 2000) are variations of Barro (1990). In all them, public investment is considered
to be a constant fraction of total output each period (the constant-ratio rule).
In a Barro-type setting, the competitive equilibrium allocation is not Pareto-eﬃcient
because of the externality driven by the public capital in the production process. However,
the purpose of the paper is not to find the policy that would restore the eﬃcient allocation.
The goal of the paper is twofold: i) to find out a more reasonable rule for public investment,
consistent with US data, than the constant-ratio rule; ii) to analyze the impact of that
rule on welfare and judge the public investment downsizing process held in US since the
end of the 60’s.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the public investment/output ratio from 1929 to 2001
in the US economy. It is clear that its path is far from being stationary. Omitting the war
and the early post-war periods, we could distinguish four phases on its evolution. First,
there is an upward sloping (upsizing) period from 1929 to approximately 1955, along which
the ratio raised from an average of 4% in the 30‘s to an average between 5.5%-6% in the
first half of the 50’s. Second, there is a short period of time, between 1956 and 1966, in
which the ratio fluctuates around 5.4%. Third, there is a downward sloping (downsizing)
period from approximately 1967 to the beginning of the 80’s, along which the ratio reduced
from levels of 5.4% to levels close to 3%. Finally, there exists a relatively stable period
from 1982 on, along which the ratio has been fluctuated around 3.3%. According to that,
a constant-ratio rule would not be a realistic assumption: the convergence process during
the upsizing and downsizing periods took enough time to consider that the economy just
jumped from one stabilized period to another. In addition, we will find in Section 2 a
positive and significative relationship between the public investment/output ratio and the
current state of the economy.2
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
This paper considers a more general and flexible rule for public investment (the active
rule) that includes the constant-ratio rule as a particular one. The government targets
a level of public investment as a percentage of output in the long-run, but along the
transition it can adjust the ratio to the current state of the economy. We assume a log-
linear functional form to capture this relationship, consistent to US data. Considering
1Endogenous growth models assign a key role to fiscal policy as a determinant of long-run economic
growth, which constitutes an attraction to use these models to study fiscal policy implications [see Barro
(1990), Rebelo (1991), Jones Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Turnovsky (1996, 2000), among many others]
2In our theoretical framework, the state variable will be the public to private capital stock ratio.
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this active rule instead of the constant-ratio rule, we find that the model simulation fits
much better the public investment downsizing and posterior stabilized process held during
1960-2001 in US, as well as the post-1970 slowdown in private factors productivity and
economic growth.
Assuming an active rule, the government problem could be seen as a coordination
problem between the short- and the long-term policy. While the relationship between
short- and long-run policies has been widely studied in the monetary policy literature,3
little work has been done regarding this subject for the fiscal policy, which is a contribution
of the paper.4 In general, depending on the short-run policy, the government would face
with a continuum of alternative paths for the public investment/output ratio, leading all
them to the same long-run target,5 and must decide the optimal combination.
A public investment measure generates a particular trade-oﬀ between initial welfare,
welfare along the transition and long-run welfare. In general, upsizing sacrifice initially
consumption, welfare and private capital in favor of public capital. Whenever the public
to private capital ratio is initially below its optimum, substituting the former by the latter
would be propitious for the economy to start growing faster along the transition and even
more than compensate the initial utility lost. A symmetric relationship is shown for
downsizing, leading in general to an initial utility raise, followed by a welfare lost or gain,
depending on whether the public to private capital ratio is below or above its optimum
level.
Given a long-run policy, the short-run measure must follow to attain the optimal
trade-oﬀ in welfare. Whenever upsizing is optimal,
the optimal path for public investment as a percentage of output shows the following
shape: an initial big jump, but keeping the ratio below its final target, followed by a
monotone and slow convergence process. That way the policy mimics the negative inci-
dence on consumption along the former periods of the transition, while the positive eﬀect
of substituting private by public capital extends throughout the whole transition. On the
other hand, whenever downsizing turns optimal, the optimal path is of the following kind:
an initial important fall, overshooting its level, followed by a monotone and fast conver-
gence process. That way, the short-run policy emphasizes the initial positive impact on
consumption, while the eﬀect on the long-run would remains almost unchanged because of
the quick convergence. In both cases, the public investment/output ratio stays during the
former periods of the transition below the welfare-maximizing ratio for a constant-ratio
3See Svensson (1999) and Taylor (1999), among many others. The monetary authority is assumed
to follow a particular policy rule, with a long-run target (generally on inflation, nominal-GDP or money
growth) as well as with a short-run active rule response to the state of the economy.
4For instance, to homogenize future members, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union imposed
several long-run targets to be achieved by any country attempting to be a potential member of the Union.
Thus each member must coordinate its short-run policy with the long-run target, in order to achieve it.
As an additional example, the International Monetary Fund gives policy guidelines to countries with
economic troubles in order to improve long-run sustained economic growth.
5The long-run target will be attained in just one period under the constant-ratio rule.
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rule, but it ends up converging towards a higher level. Thus, the latter could be seen as
a weighted average of the former.
The public capital elasticity is a controversial parameter to calibrate and is crucial to
determine the optimal policy, so we condition the welfare analysis to its magnitude. We
find that the optimal public investment path and the public capital elasticity are positive
related, as in Barro (1990) and many others. For the benchmark economy, downsizing
is optimal when the public capital elasticity is approximately lower than 0.09, a similar
value to the estimated by Munell (1990). Moreover, being a public investment/output
ratio of 0.033 an optimal choice, the public capital elasticity would need to be around
0.05. In both cases, these values are below the general consensus in the literature.6 Thus,
it is more likely that our result be consistent with, among many others, Aschauer (1989)
and Munnell (1990), which put forth that policymakers have reduced the stock of public
capital below its optimum level, in detriment also of the productivity of complementary
private inputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives empirical evidences
against the constant-ratio rule and in favor of the active rule for the US economy. Section
3 describes the framework of analysis. Section 4 exposes the competitive equilibrium and
the balanced growth path conditions. Section 5 shows the way we design and handle the
policy experiment. Section 6 simulates the model for the benchmark policy and exposes
main results for a simple policy experiment. Section 7 shows the optimal policy results.
Finally, section 8 ends with main conclusions and extensions.
2. A first exploration of data
In this section we briefly describe the evolution of some important macromagnitudes for
the US economy during 1960-2001 and study the relationship between public investment
as a percentage of real GDP , x, and the current state of the economy. We will consider
these facts to support some assumptions made in our theoretical framework. We use
yearly data for the US economy from 1930 to 2001.7 Since our theoretical framework will
be a non-stochastic endogenous growth setting, we take the public to private capital stock
ratio, kg = Kg/K, as the state variable of the economy.
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of main macroeconomic variables and public expen-
diture concepts from 1930 to 2001. We focus on the period 1960-2001. The real GDP
raised an average rate of 4.4% per year in the 60’s, and slowed down monotonically until
6Aschauer (1989) estimates an elasticity of 0.39, Munell (1990) gets a 0.1, Cazzavilan (1993) a 0.25,
Lynde and Richmond (1993) a 0.2, Ai and Cassou (1993) get an elasticity of 0.2, etc.
7Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, billions of dollars, yeared estimated series. The public in-
vestment measures the gross government fixed investment. The series of capital are the current-cost net
stock of private and public fixed assets. The series of the private sector include equipment, software and
structures. The series of the public sector include those of the general government (federal, state and
local) and government enterprises.
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an average of 2.8% in the 90’s. In the 60’s, private consumption represented a 61.8% of
total output and a 67.1% in the 90’s, while private investment remained pretty constant
along this period (it slightly raised from 15.5% to 15.7%). On the other hand, as a per-
centage to output, public consumption and public investment diminished from 17.1% and
5.2% in the 60’s to 15.5% and 3.3% in the 90’s, respectively. However, the public sector
size8 increased from an average of 24.2% to 30.3%, mainly because of the net payment
of interests and transfers. However, if we exclude the net payment of transfers, which
is nothing but a way to redistribute resources among individuals, the ratio was fairly
constant along these 40 years: the average was 18.6% in the 60’s and 18.7% in the 90’s.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Regarding the evolution of the public investment/output ratio -see Figure 1-, the
convergence process during the upsizing (1945-1955) and downsizing (1965-1980) periods
took enough time to consider that the economy just jumped from one stabilized period to
another. Hence, a constant-ratio rule might not be appropriated to capture the evolution
of the public investment/output ratio along any of these periods.
Public investment as a percentage of output might change in response to the current
state of the economy (active rule) or might not (passive rule). For the US economy we
run the following regression to study whether the public investment rule could be shown
as active or passive,
4xˆt = a+ b4kˆgt +
pX
i=1
ci4xˆt−i + εt, (2.1)
where xˆt = ln(xt/0.032) and kˆ
g
t = ln(k
g
t /0.28), being 0.032 and 0.28 the average of xt
and kgt in the 90’s.9 We test whether β is significative diﬀerent from zero (i.e., the rule is
active) or not (i.e., the rule is passive) for alternative periods of time.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 summarizes main results from estimations, from which we can infer the fol-
lowing facts: i) results are quit sensitive to the sample considered; ii) however, during
the convergence periods, the passive rule hypothesis is clearly rejected in favor of the
alternative active rule; iii) but, if we focus on the stabilized period 1982-2001, the rule
behaves as a passive one, with the parameter b not being statistically diﬀerent from zero.
8It is measured as the current public expenditure (general public consumption+net transfers+net paid
of interest) as a percentage of current GDP.
9Time series are non-stationary and non-cointegrated, so we take first diﬀerences. We add some
dynamics of x in order to rid oﬀ any significative autorregresive structure in the residuals, and thus
make estimations more eﬃcient. When considering the whole sample and the subsample of 1929-1966,
we consider a dummy variable, WWII, which takes 1 for 1942-1945 and −1 for 1946-1948, and zero
otherwise.
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3. The theoretical framework
We describe in this section the theoretical framework. It is an endogenous growth setting
with public and private capital, and three economic agents: households, firms and a
government.
3.1. Firms
There exists a continuum of identical firms producing the single commodity good in the
economy. Private capital, k˜t, and labor, l˜t, are lent by households to the firms to produce
y˜t units of output.
The total amount of physical capital used by all firms in the economy, K˜t, is taken as a
proxy for the index of knowledge available to each firm [as in Romer (1986)]. Additionally,
public capital, K˜gt , aﬀects the production process of all individual firms. Except for
these externalities, the private production technology is a standard Cobb-Douglas function
presenting constant returns to scale in the private inputs and increasing returns in the
aggregate. For any firm,
y˜t = f(l˜t, k˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t ) = F l˜
1−α
t k˜
α
t K˜
φ
t
³
K˜gt
´ϕ
, ϕ, α ∈ (0, 1), φ ≥ 0, (3.1)
where α is the share of private capital in gross output, ϕ and φ are the elasticities of
output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index, respectively, and F is a
technological scale factor.
Since firms are identical, from (3.1), aggregate output, Y˜t, is produced according to,
Y˜t = FL˜
1−α
t K˜
α+φ
t
³
K˜gt
´ϕ
, (3.2)
where L˜t is aggregate labor.
During period t, each firm pays the competitive-determined wage w˜t on the labor it
hires and the rate rt on the capital it rents. The profit maximizing problem of the typical
firm turns out to be static,
Max
{lt,kt}
f(l˜t, k˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t )− w˜tl˜t − rtk˜t.
Optimally leads to the usual marginal productivity conditions:
rt = f
0
k˜
= αF l˜1−αt k˜
α−1
t K˜
φ
t
³
K˜gt
´ϕ
= α
y˜t
k˜t
= α
Y˜t
K˜t
, (3.3)
w˜t = f
0
l˜
= (1− α)F l˜−αt k˜αt K˜
φ
t
³
K˜gt
´ϕ
= (1− α) y˜t
l˜t
= (1− α) Y˜t
L˜t
, (3.4)
where we have considered that each firm treats its own contribution to the aggregate
capital stock as given, rents the same quantity of private inputs and produces the same
amount of output.
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3.2. Households
The representative consumer chooses the fraction of time to spend as leisure. She is the
owner of the physical capital, and allocates her resources between consumption, C˜t, and
investment in physical capital, I˜kt . Private capital accumulates over time according to
K˜t+1 = (1− δk)K˜t + I˜kt , (3.5)
where K˜t+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end of time t and δ
k is the
depreciation factor for private capital, between zero and one. Zero population growth is
assumed and the time endowment is normalized to one. Decisions are made every period
to maximize the discounted aggregate value of the time separable utility function,10
∞X
t=0
βtu(C˜t, ht) =
∞X
t=0
βt
h
C˜ρt (1− ht)1−ρ
i1−θ
− 1
1− θ , ρ ∈ [0, 1], θ > 0, θ 6= 1, (3.6)
=
∞X
t=0
βt
h
ρ ln C˜t + (1− ρ) ln(1− ht)
i
, ρ ∈ [0, 1], θ = 1,
where ht is the fraction of time devoted to production, β is the discount factor, between
zero and one, 1/θ is the elasticity of substituting consumption intertemporally and ρ
characterizes the importance of consumption relative to leisure.
Her budget constraint is
C˜t + K˜t+1 + T˜t ≤ w˜tht(1− τht ) + K˜t
h
1− δk + rt
³
1− τkt
´i
, (3.7)
every period, where τkt and τ
h
t are the tax rates applied to capital and labor income,
respectively, and T˜t is a net transfer made by households to the public sector.
The representative household faces a discrete dynamic programing problem, in which
corner solutions are avoided and restrictions hold with equality due to the special form
of the instantaneous utility function and the fact that consumption and leisure are nor-
mal goods. Optimal conditions are standard: the consumption-saving decision (3.8), the
consumption-leisure choice (3.9), the budget constraint (3.7),
C˜t+1
C˜t
=


β
Ã
1− ht+1
1− ht
!(1−ρ)(1−θ) h
1− δk + rt+1
³
1− τkt+1
´i

1
1−ρ(1−θ)
, (3.8)
ρ
1− ρ =
C˜t
w˜t (1− ht) (1− τht )
, (3.9)
border constraints, C˜t > 0 and K˜t+1 > 0, ht ∈ (0, 1), and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
βtK˜t+1
∂u(C˜t, ht)
∂C˜t
=lim
t→∞
βtK˜gt+1
∂u(C˜t, ht)
∂C˜t
= 0, (3.10)
10A CES representation is assumed for the single period utility function, capturing cross-substitution
between leisure and consumption [King et al. (1988)].
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that places a limit on the accumulation of private and public capital.
3.3. The public sector
The government is characterized as a fiscal authority. We consider a broad classification
of public expenses: unproductive public expenses, C˜gt , which do not directly aﬀect the
productive process or consumers’ welfare, and public investment, I˜gt , which positively
aﬀects production. Public capital is accumulated according to
K˜gt+1 = I˜
g
t + (1− δg)K˜gt , (3.11)
where δg is the public capital depreciation factor, between zero and one.
The empirical analysis conducted in Section 2 supports the following assumptions:
A1) the government claims a constant fraction, g, of C˜gt to output each period,
g = C˜gt /Y˜t, g ∈ [0, 1); (3.12)
A2) the public investment/output ratio, x, follows an active rule during the convergence
period; A3) the rule behaves as a passive one during a stationary period.
In general, the conduct of x can be captured by a function f of state variables, s ∈
S ⊆ <n+, and a set of policy parameters, q ∈ Q ⊆ <m:
f : SxQ −→ [0, 1− g], (3.13)
such that: i) f (s; q) is continuous in SxQ; ii) there exists a policy parameter x¯ ∈ q
such that f (s¯; q) = x¯, where s¯ is the long-run equilibrium level of s; iii) there exists a
policy qˆ such that f (s; qˆ) = x¯ for all s ∈ S; iv) for q 6= qˆ and s 6= s¯, 4f/4s 6= 0 and
4f2/4s4q 6= 0. According to i)-iv), the rule is passive whenever q = qˆ; moreover, the
rule behaves as a passive one along the long-run equilibrium path. Otherwise, the rule
will be active, with x converging towards x¯, the long-run policy instrument. The degree
of response of x to the current state of the economy depends on the remaining parameters
in q, the short-run policy instruments.
Tax revenues finance total public expenses each period. We just consider a propor-
tional tax on total income as the way to collect taxes. Hence, τ t = τkt = τ
h
t and Tt = 0
for all t. The government budget constraint is:
C˜gt + I˜
g
t = τ tY˜t ⇔ g + xt = τ t. (3.14)
4. Competitive equilibrium and the balanced growth path
Given K˜0, K˜
g
0 > 0, the competitive equilibrium is a set of prices p˜t = {rt, w˜t}∞t=0, a set of
allocations
n
C˜t, ht, L˜t, K˜t+1, I˜
k
t , Y˜t, C˜
g
t , K˜
g
t+1, I˜
g
t
o∞
t=0
and a fiscal policy π˜t = {xt, g, τ t}∞t=0,
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such that, given p˜t and π˜t: i) {C˜t, ht, K˜t+1}∞t=0 maximize households’ welfare [i.e., (3.7)-
(3.10) hold]; ii) {K˜t+1, L˜t}∞t=0 satisfy the profit-maximizing conditions [(3.3)-(3.4) hold],
and I˜kt accumulates according to (3.5); iii) {C˜gt , K˜gt+1, I˜gt }∞t=0 evolve according to (3.12)-
(3.13); iv) the budget constraint of the public sector (3.14) and the technology constraint
(3.2) to produce Y˜t hold; v) markets clear every period,11
L˜t = ht, (4.1)
Y˜t = C˜t + C˜
g
t + I˜
k
t + I˜
g
t . (4.2)
A balanced growth path, bgp, is defined as an equilibrium path along which aggregate
variables either stay constant or grow at a constant rate. Barro (1990) and Jones and
Manuelli (1997), among many others, have shown that cumulative inputs must show con-
stant returns to scale in the productive process (i.e., α+ϕ+φ = 1) and rt be constant and
high enough for the equilibrium displaying positive steady-growth (hereinafter, variables
with bar “−” denotes values along the bgp). From equilibrium conditions, it is easy to
show that Y˜t, C˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t , C˜
g
t and X˜t must all grow at the same constant rate along the
bgp, denoted by γ¯ hereinafter, while bounded variables, such as the tax rate, rt and ht,
must be constant. From now on, we will focus on the special case in which α+ϕ+φ = 1.
From (3.8), a positive long-term growth rate is achieved whenever
γ¯ =
n
β
h
1− δk + (1− τ¯)r¯
io 1
1−ρ(1−θ) − 1 > 0⇔ r¯ > 1− β(1− δ
k)
(1− τ¯)β . (4.3)
However, although γ¯ will then be positive, it cannot get so high as to allow households
to follow a chain-letter action [(3.10) must hold on the bgp], i.e.,
lim
t→∞
ρ(1− h¯)(1−ρ)(1−θ)K˜0 (1 + γ¯)βt (1 + γ¯)th
C˜0(1 + γ¯)t
i1−ρ(1−θ) = 0⇔ β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ) < 1, (4.4)
which is a necessary condition to ensure time-aggregate utility (3.6) to be bounded.
5. Calibration, the policy rule and the government problem
The economy is assumed to start on the bgp associated to the benchmark calibration, with
a public capital stock, Kg0 , of 100.
12 We first calibrate the economy. Second, we assume
a particular functional form for the policy rule (3.13) consistent with data and A1)-A3).
Next, we expose the procedure to solve the competitive equilibrium for the dynamics of
level variables. Finally, we outline the government problem and the way we handle it.
11See Appendix (part 1).
12The initial state is Kg0 = 100 and K0 = 100/k¯
g
0 . In this setting, the optimal policy is invariant to
this initial condition.
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5.1. The benchmark calibration
The calibration matches the initial steady-state of the model with main macroeconomic
properties of the US economy at the beginning of the 60’s - see Table 3. The time unit
is one quarter. The set of all parameters is denoted by Φ. On its initial bgp, we want the
model to show an average proportion of working time, h¯, of 0.33, a 4% annual growth
rate (γ¯ = 0.0098 for quarterly data) and a public capital/private capital ratio, k¯g, of 0.34
-see Table 1.
According to Table 1, we set g and x¯ equal to 0.18 and 0.054, respectively. Some
technological parameters are standard in the literature: δk = 0.025 and α = 0.36. How-
ever, the broad empirical literature discussing the productive nature of public capital
shows controversial conclusions, diﬀerent data sources and econometric techniques lead-
ing to rather diﬀerent estimations of ϕ.13 For example, the public capital elasticity varies
from 0.06 in Ratner (1983) to the 0.39 in Aschauer (1989). Munnell (1990) uses data for
48 states in the post-war US economy and estimates the public capital elasticity to be
about 0.1, while Lynde and Richmond (1993) use time series techniques, accounting for
non-stationarity in the data, estimating ϕ equal to 0.2. For the benchmark economy, we
choose ϕ = 0.15 and φ = 0.49, so that α+ ϕ+ φ = 1. Because of its importance, we will
consider alternative values of ϕ when carrying out the policy analysis.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) suggest a relative risk aversion parameter between 1 and
2, and we pick θ = 1.5. Finally, being β = 0.99, ρ, F and δg are chosen to maintain h¯, γ¯
and k¯g at the values mentioned above.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
5.2. The log-linear public investment rule
We assume a specific functional form for f(·) in (3.13) to solve the competitive equilibrium.
The following log-linear specification is consistent with A1)-A3):
xt = x¯
³
kgt /k¯
g
´η
, (5.1)
ln(xt) = ln(x¯) + η ln
³
kgt /k¯
g
´
,
being q = {x¯, η}. In addition, this specification shows several advantages. First, it is
easy to deal with when solving the model for the competitive equilibrium; second, it fits
pretty well to data;14 third, the parameters have a straightforward interpretation: x¯ is
the long-run policy instrument and η is the elasticity between x and kg (i.e., the short-run
policy instrument). If η = 0, the rule is passive and xt = x¯ every period. Otherwise, the
13Section 4 of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and Munnell (1992) show a selective review of these
empirical studies.
14We have considered several specifications (linear, polynomial,...) and the higher adjusted R2 is that
of the log-linear specification.
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rule turns active. Additionally, the rule is called pro-cyclical whenever η > 0, while it is
counter-cyclical if η < 0.15
5.3. Solving for the dynamics of level variables
The competitive equilibrium cannot be analytically solved, so a numerical solution is
required. However, numerical techniques are designed to solve the transitional dynamics
of variables with a well defined steady-state, which is not the case for level variables in
an endogenous growth framework. An alternative approach is to deal with normalized
variables. Hereinafter, Zt denotes the normalized level of Z˜t, Zt = Z˜t/(1+γ¯)t, which grows
at a zero rate along the bgp. But the steady-state of Zt is not well defined, and standard
numerical methods applied directly to normalized variables cannot be used either. The
standard approach is to solve the equilibrium for stationary ratios, but that strategy
precludes the possibility of analyzing welfare issues. In the Appendix (part 2), we describe
a procedure that combines the dynamics of stationary ratios - ct = C˜t/K˜t, k
g
t = K˜
g
t /K˜t,
yt = Y˜t/K˜t and kt+1 = K˜t+1/K˜t - and equilibrium conditions to recover the equilibrium
path for normalized variables, starting from an initial state of the economy.16
5.4. The government problem
The government is benevolent in the sense that its objective function is to maximize the
welfare of the representative consumer, given competitive equilibrium conditions. Given
the tax system and the public consumption to output ratio, g, the government makes
decision on its investment plans. Under the log-linear policy rule (5.1), a public investment
policy is given by the pair q = {x¯, η}. The welfare maximizing policy will be denoted
by q+ = {x¯+, η+}. A standard search method is used to numerically handle this control
problem [as in Jones et al. (1993)].
For each policy and simulation, we check the following conditions: i) Kt+1, K
g
t+1, Ct,
Yt must be positive; ii) ht, τ t must belong to (0,1); iii) xt has to be inside (0, 1−g); iv) the
npg condition (4.4) must hold; v) xt must converge17 towards x¯ in a reasonable number
of periods (i.e., 200 periods or 50 years); vi) the government is not allowed to destroy
infrastructures, unless they will be restored in the current period, i.e., Igt − δgKgt ≥ 0.
These conditions limit, in a reasonable sense, the set of investment policies available to
the government.
For any pair {x¯, η}: a) we solve numerically the balanced growth path equilibrium; b)
we recover time series of Ct and ht from their log-linear approximations, as it is shown in
the Appendix (part 2); c) we check conditions i)-vi) and move to the next steps whenever
15We use the same terminology than in the cycle literature.
16Novales et al. (1999) describes an alternative method to solve for the dynamics of level variables in
an endogenous growth setting.
17We accept convergence whenever |x¯− xt| < 0.001.
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they are satisfied; d) we evaluate total welfare -see Appendix (part 3)-.18’19
∞X
t=0



h
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
it
[Cρt (1− ht)1−ρ]
1−θ
1− θ −
βt
1− θ



; (5.2)
e) the process is repeated for any feasible policy, and the one maximizing (5.2) is the
welfare-maximizing choice.
6. A policy experiment
We address several issues in this section: i) the ability of the model to fit the downsizing
period 1960-2001; ii) the shape of xt under the log-linear policy rule; iii) the welfare
trade-oﬀ due to a particular public investment policy.
6.1. Simulating the benchmark economy
We assume the economy exhibits initially balanced growth with public investment/output
ratio of 0.054. Its long-run target changes and the economy moves to a new and stable
bgp. The benchmark policy sets qb =
n
x¯b; ηb
o
= {0.032; 0.52} in (5.1), those parameters
estimated in (2.1) for the 1960-2001 period. The constant-ratio rule would set qo =
{0.032; 0} in (5.1).
The downsizing process in public investment held during the 1960-2001 period drove
the economy to a gradual reduction in the public to private capital ratio (see Section
2). This fact might had to do, at least partially, with the post-1970 slowdown in private
factors productivity and economic growth. In terms of total output, private investment
substituted public capital initially, but it ended falling towards its initial level due to,
among other reasons, the mentioned reduction in private factors productivity. Finally,
there was a positive income eﬀect in consumption, that increased its fraction to output.
For the benchmark policy, the model simulation captures pretty well all these facts and
some others commented below.
Figure 2 compares the simulated paths of x and kg under qo and qb with the observed
time series along the 1960-2001 period. The downsizing and posterior stabilized process is
much better fitted by the simulation under the active policy than under the passive one.
The former shows the pronounced downsizing trend of public investment from mid-60’s
to mid-70’s, as well as the slowdown in its downsizing process from mid-70’s to mid-80’s
and, finally, its stabilization from mid-80’s on.
18Appendix 3 shows how we evaluate this infinite sum.
19The feasible set of welfare levels is bounded because: i) the numerical procedure imposes the compet-
itive equilibrium to be on the stable manifold, hence Ct and ht eventually stabilize; ii) γ¯ is bounded from
above by (4.4). Moreover, since utility is continuous and strictly concave and the choice set is convex,
there exists at most one interior solution to the government problem.
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 compares initial and final values of main ratios in the simulation with their
observed annual averages in 1955-1967 and 1995-2001. The initial values of x, kg and γ
obviously coincide, since we match them in the model calibration. According to data,
kg falls from an average of 0.35 to 0.28, while it does until 0.24 in the simulation; the
annual growth rate falls from an average of 4.2% to 2.8%, instead of the 3.1% shown
in the simulation. On the other hand, the ratios C/Y and Ik/Y are significative larger
and smaller, respectively, than those predicted by the simulation. However, if we account
as private investment those purchases in durable goods done by households (like cars,
houses,...), the diﬀerence is almost insignificant. Nevertheless, the simulation captures
several important facts for the period on concern: i) C/Y is significative higher than
Ik/Y ; ii) through the end of the simulation, the level of C/Y is slightly higher than the
initial one, and iii) Ik/Y increases initially but it returns to its starting value by the end
of the sample.
6.2. Alternative shapes for the public investment/output ratio
The public sector commits to follow the policy rule (5.1), so the public investment/output
ratio path depends on {x¯, η}. Table 5 and Figure 3 summarize their main properties.
In general, k¯g and x¯ are directly related. A higher level of x¯ increases the long-run
income tax rate, which disincentives the accumulation of private capital, at the same time
the government enforces to accumulate more public capital. Thus, given x¯0 and k¯
g
0, the
ratios x¯/x¯0 and k¯
g
0/k¯
g move in opposite directions. Using the same argument, xt and k
g
t+1
are also positive related. However, the relationship between xt and k
g
t depends on the
sign of η.
From (5.1), the initial impact on x is measured by:
x1
x0
=
x¯
x0
³
kg1/k¯
g
´η
=
x¯
x¯0
³
k¯g0/k¯
g
´η
, (6.1)
where x0 = x¯0 and k
g
1 = k¯
g
0, their initial steady-state levels, and x¯ and k¯
g are the final
ones.20 Let’s suppose a long-run downsizing policy, x¯ < x¯0. From (6.1), it is easy to
show that a counter-cyclical policy, η < 0, provokes an initial large negative impact on x,
overshooting the long-run target x¯ in the first period (i.e., x1 < x¯).21 On the other hand,
if the short-run policy is pro-cyclical, the bigger η, the further x1 above x¯ is going to be.22
20kg1 = k¯
g
0 because k
g
1 is a result of a decision taken on the previous period, in which the policy had not
changed.
21Since x¯/x¯0 < 1, then k¯
g
0/k¯
g > 1, but
¡
k¯g0/k¯
g
¢η
< 1 because η < 0. Hence, x1/x0 < x¯/x¯0 and x1 < x¯,
since x0 = x¯0.
22Moreover, it could even be the case that x will raise initially, to then start converging towards x¯.
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After that initial impact, a similar argument can be used to explain the evolution of xt
along the transition, and its convergence is monotone towards its steady-state. Therefore,
a long-run downsizing policy keeps x below its steady-state level when combined with a
counter-cyclical measure, while x remains above its long-run target when combined with
a pro-cyclical policy.
A symmetric pattern is shown for long-run upsizing, x¯ > x¯0: if η < 0, then xt > x¯,
while xt < x¯ whenever η > 0. Thus, a long-run upsizing policy combined with a counter-
cyclical measure keeps the public investment/output ratio above its final steady-state
level, while the ratio remains below its long-run target when combined with a pro-cyclical
policy.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Regarding the transitional dynamics, the larger η, the slower the convergence speed.
Moreover, a big enough level of η makes x never converge to its steady-state. The intuition
of that result is similar to that in the cycle literature, when arguing why a pro-cyclical
policy enlarges cycles.
6.3. A simple policy experiment
Starting with an initial public investment/output ratio of 0.054, its average in the 60’s,
the government implements either a long-run upsizing policy, setting x¯ = 0.10, or a
downsizing one, setting x¯ = 0.02. A continuity argument suggests that policies inside this
range must fall between these extremes. For each x¯, we consider alternative values of η,
−2, 0 and 0.5.23 Figure 4 shows the path of main macroeconomic ratios for the combined
policies.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In general, under the upsizing (downsizing) policy, the public investment/output ratio
and the income tax rate increase (fall) initially for reasonable levels of η.24 In general, it
initially disincentives (incentives) labor and private capital accumulation, but instead it
incentives (disincentives) the accumulation of public capital. Hence, the public to private
capital ratio raises (falls) initially. Finally, private consumption falls (raises), due to the
negative (positive) income eﬀect of the policy measure.
We have already seen that the public investment/output ratio overshoots its long-
run target when combined with a counter-cyclical measure. Because of that reason, the
23For the benchmark economy, a policy with η approximately larger than 0.75 is unfeasible, in the
sense that x needs more than 200 periods to converge, while with a η approximately lower than −3 is
also unfeasible, in the sense that Ig − δgKg < 0.
24As it was commented in section 5.2, a very large level of η would make x fall initially, although
x¯ > x0. However, this possibility leads to unfeasible policies for the benchmark economy.
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counter-cyclical measure emphasizes the eﬀect of the long-run policy along the former
periods of the transition. Moreover, since it helps the economy to move faster towards
its steady-state trajectory, the long-run impact remains almost unchanged. A symmetric
behavior is shown for a pro-cyclical policy.
6.4. The welfare trade-oﬀ
In principle, the initial impact on welfare is uncertain, since private consumption and
leisure move in opposite directions. With respect to stay on the initial balanced growth
path, Figure 5 shows the relative welfare gain for the ten initial periods, the next hundred
and from the two hundred periods on (the long-run welfare) for the following policies:
{0.02;−2}, {0.02; 0.5}, {0.10;−2} and {0.10; 0.5}. According to it, the eﬀect on private
consumption prevails, and welfare falls initially for the upsizing policy, while it raises for
the downsizing.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
This figure reveals an additional interesting fact. A public investment policy produces
a particular trade-oﬀ between initial welfare, welfare along the transition and long-run
welfare. Upsizing policies, such as {0.10;−2} and {0.10; 0.5}, crowd-out private resources
in favor of public infrastructure, so they diminish welfare, at least along the former periods
of the transition. However, whenever the public to private capital ratio is initially below its
optimum level, substituting the former by the latter might impulse the economy to growing
faster after a certain number of periods, which might even more than compensate the
initial utility lost. On the other hand, this substitution would never be able to compensate
the initial lost in welfare. According to Figure 4, our benchmark economy is identified
with the first group and then upsizing will be optimal.25 A symmetric relationship is
shown for downsizing, leading to an initial utility raise and a posterior welfare lost.
Given the long-run policy, the short-run measure must follow to attain the optimal
trade-oﬀ in welfare. Depending on the long-run target, the optimal short-run policy might
be diﬀerent. For instance, relative to a counter-cyclical measure, a pro-cyclical policy
reduces the welfare lost along the former periods of the transition due to an upsizing
process. In the long-run, welfare is pretty the same since they share common long-
run targets. Hence, a long-run upsizing policy must be combined with a pro-cyclical
measure in order to maximize aggregate welfare. On the other hand, by symmetry, a
long-run downsizing policy must be combined with a counter-cyclical measure to maximize
aggregate welfare. We will come back to that point latter.
25We will see this result in the next section.
15
7. The optimal public investment policy
The government commits to follow the log-linear policy rule (5.1) and decides two policy
parameters, x¯ and η. Thus, the government faces with a continuum of short-run policies,
leading all them to the same long-run target. While the long-run instrument, x¯, aﬀects
the steady-state of the economy, the short-run policy tool, η, might aﬀect its transitional
dynamics. The government pursues to combine them in an optimal way.
Since the public capital elasticity, ϕ, is a controversial parameter to calibrate26 and is
crucial to determine the optimal policy,27 we condition the welfare analysis to its magni-
tude. Table 6 summarizes the optimal policy for the benchmark economy and alternative
values of ϕ. For each ϕ, we show the optimal policy under the constant-ratio rule, {x¯0+; 0},
the active rule, {x¯+; η+}, and the public investment/output ratio maximizing the long-run
economic growth rate, x¯∗. Welfare, growth and steady-states are shown in relative terms
to the initial balanced growth path.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
As expected, x¯+, x¯0+ and x¯∗ are positive related with ϕ (see Figure 6) as in Barro
(1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Turnovsky (1996, 2000). Thus, starting with
an initial public investment/output ratio, 0.054 in our case, and taxing income propor-
tionally, downsizing would be optimal in economies where public capital is not important
enough in the productive process. In our benchmark economy and according to Figure 6,
downsizing turns optimal when the public capital elasticity is approximately lower than
0.09, a similar value to that estimated by Munell (1990). Moreover, the public capital
elasticity would need to be around 0.05 for a long-run public investment/output ratio of
0.032, the level in the 90’s, being an optimal choice. These values are in both cases below
the general consensus in the literature. Thus, it is more likely that our result be con-
sistent with, among many others, Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990), which put forth
that policymakers have reduced the stock of public capital below its optimum level, in
detriment also of the productivity of complementary private inputs and economic growth.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The growth maximizing policy sets x¯∗ equal to (1 − g)ϕ, a standard result in the
literature. Under a constant-ratio rule, the welfare-maximizing public investment/output
ratio x¯0+ is always lower than x¯∗, as in Futagami et al. (1993). The existence of tran-
sitional dynamics generates in this setting a trade-oﬀ between consumption along the
former periods of the transition and growth in the long-run, that makes the optimal pub-
lic investment/output ratio be lower than the one maximizing growth. For instance, a
26See section 5.1.
27See, among others, Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Turnovsky (1996, 2000).
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faster convergence would reduce this trade-oﬀ, hence the welfare maximizing policy would
be closer to the growth maximizing one.
On the other hand, an active rule allows along the transition for a non-constant path
of the public investment/output ratio and the tax rate, hence being able to achieve a
better trade-oﬀ for aggregate welfare. Figure 7 compares the public investment/output
ratio path under {x¯0+; 0} and {x¯+; η+} for ϕ = 0.15 -upsizing is optimal- and ϕ = 0.07
-downsizing is optimal. Along the former periods of the transition, the optimal ratio
stays below x¯0+, but it ends up converging towards a level x¯+ between x¯0+ and x¯∗. It
would be suboptimal that x¯+ being higher than the one maximizing growth, since that
would induce lower growth and consumption along the final balanced growth path. In
any case, as expected, x¯0+ could be seen as a weighted average of the optimal public
investment/output ratio path under an active policy.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Upsizing has two main eﬀects on the economy: i) the eﬀect of raising public capital
and ii) the eﬀect of raising taxes. The latter is always harmful for welfare, since now the
private sector would have less resources to consume. Thus, whenever upsizing is optimum,
the optimal path would never overshoot its long-run target, but would stay below its
long-run target, since otherwise the harmful impact on consumption and welfare would
be emphasized. Moreover, the public to private capital ratio must be initially below its
optimum, and its increment should more than compensate the harmful impact of raising
taxes. According to our results, upsizing must be combined with a pro-cyclical policy
and convergence is monotone and slow. This combination extends the positive eﬀect of
substituting public capital by private capital throughout the whole transition, at the same
time the tax raise is very smooth in order to mimic the negative incidence on consumption.
On the other hand, downsizing induces a positive income eﬀect on private consumption
and welfare, since now more resources are available to the private sector. Whenever
downsizing is optimal, the optimal short-run policy would make the public investment
output ratio fall below its final level, enhancing this way the positive eﬀect on consumption
and welfare. This eﬀect should more than compensate the possible negative impact of
falling public capital. However, if initially the public to private capital ratio is high enough,
the eﬀect of falling public capital is in fact positive. According to our results, downsizing
must be combined with a counter-cyclical policy and convergence is monotone and fast.
Precisely, this combination emphasizes consumption and welfare along the former periods
of the transition and, since convergence is fast, the possible negative impact of falling
public capital is less likely.
We close this section remarking the eﬀect of the initial public investment/output ratio
on the optimal policy. Obviously, concluding that downsizing or upsizing is optimal de-
pends on this inial level. It is widely accepted in the literature that several items in public
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consumption can be considered as productive,28 so the initial public investment/output
ratio could be higher than the benchmark 0.054. Under a constant-ratio rule, the optimal
policy is robust to the initial public investment/output ratio. Moreover, the relationship
between x¯o+, x¯+ and x¯∗ is also robust to x0, being x¯∗ ≥ x¯+ ≥ x¯o+ independently on the
nature of the optimal policy.
8. Conclusions and extensions
In dynamic settings with public capital, it is common to assume that the government
claims a constant fraction of public investment to total output each period. We first show
that this is not a realistic assumption for US to validate the downsizing process held in
this country since the end of the sixties. We relax this assumption and consider a more
flexible rule for public investment, consistent to US data. Given a long-run target for the
public investment/output ratio, the government can adjust this ratio along the transition
to the current state of the economy.
In comparison to the constant-ratio rule, a model simulation exercise fits better the
downsizing process in public investment as well as the post-1970 slowdown in private
factors productivity and economic growth. This downsizing process starts with a public
investment output ratio of 0.054 and ends with 0.032. In our policy analysis, this process
would be close to the optimal one whenever the public capital elasticity would be around
0.05, which leads us to support the idea that policymakers have reduced the stock of public
capital below its optimum level along this time. Since downsizing has been a general trend
in the last 40 years in most Occidental Economies, it would be interesting to extend the
analysis made in this paper to these economies.
The attempt made in the paper to study a more realistic rule for public investment
could be connected with two issues: 1) the coordination between short- and long-term
policies; 2) the characterization of the optimal public investment path. The former was
already commented in the Introduction and was used to motivate the paper. Because of
its interest and complexity, the latter is left for a future extension. The idea is that a
more flexible public investment rule than that considered in the paper might approach
the public investment/output ratio path, xt, to the one obtained by solving the Ramsey
problem. St denotes the set of state variables at time t, so the Ramsey path can be
expressed as xt = g[St(Φ)], Φ being the fundamentals of the economy and g(·) showing
a generally unknown, continuous and monotone function in St. The approach carried in
the paper assumes ex-ante that xt = f [St(Φ, Q);Q], where Q is a set of policy parameters
and f(·) is a well known function. Given f(·), the government decides on Q, so the
optimization problem reduces to a parameterized maximization problem. On the other
hand, in the Ramsey framework, the government has to choose the optimal xt, given St,
every period, which is a much more tedious problem to deal with. Moreover, since g(·)
28For example, see Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
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is unknown, it is diﬃcult to make predictions and simulate the model without solving
previously the Ramsey problem.
On the other hand, coordinating short- and long-run fiscal policies is an issue of utmost
interest that requires extending the analysis made in this paper in several directions. It
is clear that the optimal public investment policy depends on the cost of raising resources
to finance public expenditures, and the tax base becomes crucial. Hence, alternative
financing structures should be considered in our analysis. Another extension of the paper
regards the particular shape of the public investment rule. More interesting policy rules
could be considered. For instance, the public sector could have several short-run policy
tools at its disposal, allowing the government to select among a higher set of public
investment plans. In addition, since politicians increasingly make decisions according to
the evolution of real macroeconomic variables, specifying a reasonable policy rule would
be a convenient way to describe the performance of the public expenditure plans.
19
9. Appendix
9.1. Part 1: Competitive equilibrium conditions
In terms of stationary ratios, ct = C˜t/K˜t, k
g
t = K˜
g
t /K˜t, yt = Y˜t/K˜t and kt+1 = K˜t+1/K˜t,
competitive equilibrium conditions can be reduced to a system of seven equations in c,
kg, y, k, r, h and τ ,
kt+1
ct+1
ct
=


β
Ã
1− ht+1
1− ht
!(1−ρ)(1−θ) h
1− δk + (1− τ t+1)rt+1
i

1
1−ρ(1−θ)
, (9.1)
ρ
1− ρ =
ct
(1− τ t) (1− α)yt
ht
1− ht
, (9.2)
yt(1− g) = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk) + x¯yt
³
kgt /k¯
g
´η
, (9.3)
rt = αyt, (9.4)
yt = Fh
1−α
t (k
g
t )
ϕ , (9.5)
kt+1k
g
t+1 = (1− δg) kgt + x¯yt
³
kgt /k¯
g
´η
, (9.6)
τ t = g + x¯
³
kgt /k¯
g
´η
, (9.7)
where (9.1) corresponds to (3.8); (9.2) comes from combining (3.9) with (3.4) and (4.1);
(9.3) combines (4.2) with (3.5), (3.12) and (5.1); (9.4) comes directly from (3.3); (9.5)
combines (3.2) with (4.1); (9.6) combines (5.1) with (3.11); finally, (9.7) combines (3.14)
with (3.12) with (5.1).
9.2. Part 2: Solving the transitional dynamics for normalized variables
A log-linear based approach is used to solve for the dynamics of stationary ratios [Uhlig
(1999)]. V (t) includes the beginning-of-period state variables, just kgt in our model; Q(t)
is the vector of real variables (yt, ct, rt, ht, kt+1, τ t). Their values on the bgp are denoted
by V¯ and Q¯, and vˆ(t) and qˆ(t) denote log-deviations of V (t) and Q(t) around V¯ and Q¯,
respectively.
First, we consider the benchmark calibration and solve (9.1)-(9.7) for the bgp, getting³
y¯, c¯, r¯, h¯, k¯, τ¯ , k¯g
´
.
Second, we log-linearize (9.1)-(9.7) around the bgp. He proposes a procedure where
optimal conditions are log-linearized without the need of diﬀerentiating. A variable Ua
can be approximated as:µ
U
U¯
¶a
= exp
µ
a ln
µ
U
U¯
¶¶
= exp(au) ' (1 + auˆ)⇒ Ua ' U¯a(1 + auˆ). (9.8)
In addition, we can assume vˆ1vˆ2 ' 0 if variables are close enough to their steady-state
values. Log-linearized versions of (9.1)-(9.7) are (all variables are in log-deviations about
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the steady-state):
cˆt+1 − cˆt + kˆt+1 +
ρ˜θ˜h¯
1− h¯(hˆt+1 − hˆt) +
θ˜δkr¯ [(1− τ¯) rˆt+1 − τ¯ τˆ t+1]
1− δkr¯(1− τ¯)
= 0, (9.9)
cˆt − yˆt +
τ¯
1− τ¯ τˆ t +
1
1− h¯ hˆt = 0, (9.10)
y¯ (1− g − x¯) yˆt − c¯cˆt − k¯kˆt+1 − x¯y¯ηkˆgt = 0, (9.11)
rˆt − yˆt = 0, (9.12)
yˆt − (1− α)hˆt − ϕkˆgt = 0, (9.13)
k¯k¯g
³
kˆt+1 + kˆ
g
t+1
´
− (1− δg)k¯gkˆgt − x¯y¯yˆt − x¯y¯ηkˆgt = 0, (9.14)
x¯ηk¯gt − τ¯ τ¯ t = 0, (9.15)
where θ˜ = 1
1−ρ(1−θ) and ρ˜ = (1 − ρ)(1 − θ). Steady-state conditions have been used
to simplify these expressions. Conditions (9.9)-(9.15) can be grouped into the following
matrix system:
Avˆ(t+ 1) +Bvˆ(t) + Cqˆ(t) = 0, (9.16)
F vˆ(t+ 2) +Gvˆ(t+ 1) +Hvˆ(t) + Jqˆ(t+ 1) +Kqˆ(t) = 0, (9.17)
where the Euler condition (9.9) is (9.17), (9.10)-(9.15) are grouped into (9.16), and ma-
trices A, B, C,..., are functions of all structural and policy parameters.
Third, assuming the following log-linear law of motion for Q(t) and V (t),
vˆ(t+ 1) = P vˆ(t), (9.18)
qˆ(t) = Svˆ(t), (9.19)
the system (9.16)-(9.17) are directly solved by the undetermined coeﬃcients method,
imposing the eigenvalues of P to be inside the unit circle.
Fourth, starting with (K0, K
g
0), and k
g
0 = K
g
0/K0, we get C0 and h0 from (9.19)


Y0
C0
r0
h0
k1
τ 0


=


K0 0 0 0 0 0
0 K0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


Q(0), (9.20)
with Q(0) = exp
h
S
³
ln kg0 − ln k¯g
´
+ ln Q¯
i
= (c0 y0 r0 h0 k1 τ 0)
0
. K1 is easily recovered
from k1,
K1 =
K0k1
k¯
. (9.21)
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Next, normalized private investment is given by,
Ik0 = k¯K1 −K0
³
1− δk
´
. (9.22)
From (9.3), Y0 is given by
Y0 =
C0 + I
k
0
1− g − x¯
³
kg0
k¯g
´η (9.23)
Finally,
Cg0 = gY0, (9.24)
Ig0 = x¯
Ã
kg0
k¯g
!η
Y0, (9.25)
Kg1 = (I
g
0 +K
g
0 (1− δg)) /k¯. (9.26)
Values for next periods are obtained in a recursive way. The resulting time series are
stable since stability conditions are imposed when solving the system (9.16)-(9.17).
9.3. Part 3: Computing welfare
We truncate the infinite sum in (5.2) at period T ∗. T ∗ is chosen so that equilibrium time
series are close enough to the bgp, i.e.,
¯¯¯
XT ∗ − X¯
¯¯¯
< 10−3, with T ∗ < 200 (50 years). Time
series {Ct, ht}T ∗t=0 are used to evaluate welfare up to period T ∗:
T ∗X
t=0



h
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
it
[Cρt (1− ht)1−ρ]
1−θ
1− θ −
βt
(1− θ)



. (9.27)
After period T ∗ the economy is considered to be on the final bgp [this strategy is similar
to that used in Jones et al. (1993)]. Since β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ) < 1 by (4.4), the term
∞X
t=T ∗+1



h
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
it h
CρT∗(1− h¯)1−ρ
i1−θ
− βt
1− θ



(9.28)
=
h
CρT ∗(1− h¯)1−ρ
i1−θ hβ(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)iT ∗+1
(1− θ) [1− β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)] −
βT
∗+1
(1− θ) (1− β)
approximates aggregate utility after period T ∗. Notice that (9.27) and (9.28) must be
computed simultaneously, because CT∗ depends on the whole transitional dynamics up to
period T ∗.
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Appendix of tables
Table 1: Main Macromagnitudes and Public Sector Expenditure of US(1)
USA 30 40 50 60 70 80 90(2)
Real GDP growth rate (%) 1.3 6.0 4.2 4.4 3.3 3.0 2.8
Private consumption(3) 76.9 60.6 62.5 61.8 62.4 64.3 67.1
Gross Private Investment(3) 8.1 10.6 15.8 15.5 16.7 16.9 15.7
Gross Public Investment(3),(4) 4.1 8.7 5.4 5.2 3.7 3.6 3.3
Public Consumption(3) 10.6 19.0 16.1 17.1 17.5 17.0 15.5
Public Capital/Private Capital (%) 21.6 39.3 32.9 35.5 34.2 29.1 28.0
General public expenditures(4)
Current expenditure(3) 14.5 24.0 21.9 24.2 28.2 30.4 30.3
Consumption expenditures(3) 10.6 19.0 16.1 17.1 17.5 17.0 15.5
Transfer payments (net)(3) 2.3 3.2 4.4 5.4 8.7 10.0 11.2
Net interest paid(3) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.9 3.3
Current expenditure − Transfers(3) 12.0 20.4 17.4 18.6 19.1 19.9 18.7
(1) anual averages; (2) 2000 and 2001 are included; (3) percentage to real GDP;
(4) Includes federal, local and public enterprises.
Table 2: Estimation results
29-01 29-60 60-01 80-01
α −0.02
(0.04)
(∗∗) −0.02
(0.04)
(∗∗) −0.00
(0.01)
(∗∗) −0.00
(0.01)
(∗∗)
β 1.14
(0.63)
1.26
(0.80)
0.52
(0.27)
−0.06
(0.89)
(∗∗)
δ1 0.50
(0.17)
0.49
(0.18)
0.26
(0.18)
(∗) 0.26
(0.21)
(∗∗)
δ2 −0.18
(0.08)
−0.19(∗)
(0.10)
−0.24(∗)
(0.16)
—
WWII −1.37
(0.16)
−1.36
(0.17)
— —
R2 0.71 0.73 0.16 0.07
DW 2.29 2.31 1.78 1.92
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. DW is Durbin-Watson statistic, rejecting
the existence of AR(1) structure in the residuals. The correlogram of residuals shows lack of
structure as well. (*) Non-significative at 5%, but it is at 10%; (**) Non-significative at 10%.
Table 3: Benchmark calibration
F α ϕ φ δk δg
0.403 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.025 0.016
β θ x¯0 g ρ
0.99 1.5 0.054 0.18 0.38
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Table 4: Public Investment/output ratio transitional dynamics
x¯ < x¯0 (long-run downsizing) x¯ > x¯0 (long-run upsizing)
InI Tr InI Tr
η << 0 unfeasible: in general because
Ig cannot be smaller than −δgKg
unfeasible: in general because either C
or Ik turns negative or smaller than −δkK
η < 0 negative andovershooting x¯
fast and smooth
convergence towards x¯
positive and
overshooting x¯
fast and smooth
convergence towards x¯
η = 0 negative x=x¯ in justone period
positive x=x¯ in just
one period
η > 0 negative, but neverovershooting x¯
slow and smooth
convergence towards x¯
positive, but never
overshooting x¯
slow and smooth
convergence towards x¯
η >> 0 unfeasible: in general because: i) C<0, ii) I
k<−δkK or
iii) x requires a long time to get x¯
unfeasible: in general because: i) Ig cannot be smaller
than −δgKg ; ii) x requires a long time to achieve x¯
Note: InI: Initial impact; Tr: transitional dynamics
Table 5: Real and simulated values for the benchmark economy. Initial and final values.
x g C/Y C/Y (∗) Ik/Y Ik/Y (∗∗) kg γ
Real: 1960(1) 0.054 0.18 0.63 0.53 0.16 0.24 0.35 0.042
Simulation: 1960(3) 0.054 0.18 0.56 0.56 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.042
Real: 2001(2) 0.032 0.18 0.67 0.59 0.16 0.24 0.28 0.028
Simulation: 2001(s) 0.034 0.18 0.58 0.58 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.031
(1) average from 1955-67; (2) average from 1995-2001; (3) values corresponding to the initial
steady-state; (4) value in the simulation at 2001; (*) excluding expenditure in durable goods;
(**) including expenditure in durable goods.
Table 6: Optimal policies for alternative levels of public capital
θ xi (1) η γ (2) Wel (3) speed(4) Ct ht Yt Kgt+1 Kt+1 τ C/Y Ik/Y Ig/Y Cg/Y tax h Kg/K
0.050 0.040 -1.00 0.960 3.78 10.52 3.21 0.31 0.41 -1.38 0.18 -10.65 0.010 0.004 -0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.093
0.050 0.031 0.00 0.104 3.12 22.88 3.10 -0.16 -0.11 -1.27 0.09 -9.83 0.016 0.006 -0.023 0.000 -0.023 0.000 -0.150
0.050 0.042 0.00 0.966 2.30 22.82 1.60 -0.06 -0.05 -0.67 0.04 -5.13 0.008 0.003 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.080
0.070 0.045 -2.20 -0.808 2.01 6.25 2.90 0.88 0.99 -1.29 0.30 -10.51 0.007 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.060
0.070 0.043 0.00 -1.185 0.57 23.69 1.51 -0.12 -0.06 -0.58 0.05 -4.70 0.008 0.003 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.073
0.070 0.059 0.00 0.083 -0.61 23.59 -0.68 0.04 0.02 0.27 -0.02 2.14 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.034
0.10 0.07 0.40 2.82 0.991 45.68 -1.19 0.27 0.20 0.39 -0.03 3.48 -0.011 -0.004 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.104
0.10 0.06 0.00 2.03 0.347 24.50 -1.25 0.13 0.06 0.44 -0.05 3.85 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.062
0.10 0.08 0.00 3.54 -1.082 24.37 -3.84 0.33 0.16 1.40 -0.13 11.97 -0.021 -0.007 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.198
0.15 0.10 0.22 16.02 7.920 34.84 -5.00 1.16 0.75 1.51 -0.17 14.72 -0.037 -0.012 0.049 0.000 0.049 0.001 0.355
0.15 0.09 0.00 14.76 6.289 25.13 -5.64 0.81 0.31 1.77 -0.24 17.09 -0.030 -0.010 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.001 0.286
0.15 0.12 0.00 17.12 3.811 24.92 -9.57 1.12 0.41 3.13 -0.37 29.49 -0.052 -0.017 0.069 0.000 0.069 0.001 0.516
0.20 0.14 0.16 35.20 20.953 32.14 -9.08 2.29 1.29 2.46 -0.37 26.53 -0.062 -0.019 0.082 0.000 0.082 0.003 0.618
0.20 0.13 0.00 33.53 18.271 25.05 -10.10 1.73 0.51 2.83 -0.49 30.34 -0.054 -0.017 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.003 0.526
0.20 0.17 0.00 36.86 14.092 24.75 -15.62 2.19 0.51 4.61 -0.69 47.86 -0.084 -0.027 0.112 0.000 0.112 0.003 0.888
0.25 0.17 0.14 58.21 40.381 30.97 -12.80 3.61 1.86 3.11 -0.59 37.18 -0.087 -0.027 0.113 0.000 0.113 0.005 0.881
0.25 0.15 0.00 55.44 36.065 24.52 -13.88 2.74 0.54 3.47 -0.76 41.45 -0.075 -0.023 0.097 0.000 0.097 0.005 0.737
0.25 0.21 0.00 60.80 28.812 24.07 -21.90 3.46 0.20 5.86 -1.08 67.09 -0.119 -0.039 0.157 0.000 0.157 0.005 1.321
(1): For elasticity, it first shows the optimal ratio under an active rule, next under a passive, finally the one maximizing long-run growth.
(2): Difference between the final and initial steady-state.
(3): Along the initial bgp, the equivalent difference (%) in consumption required to get the welfare level in the final bgp.
(4): :it measures the number of periods to cover half of the distance between the initial and the final steady-state 
Initial impacts (%) steady-state for normalized variables (3)
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Figure 2: Downsizing in US. Real and simulated series
Public Investment/Output ratio. Real and simulated data
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Figure 3: The public investment/output ratio path
Public investment downsizing. Alternative short-run policies
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Figure 4: Transitional dynamics of main ratios. Upsizing and downsizing experiment
Evolution of Ig/Y under alternative extreme short-run policies. Initial Ig/Y=0.054 and 
final Ig/Y=0.02 (downsizing experiment)
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Figure 5: The welfare trade-oﬀ
Wefare gain along the transition under alternative public investment policies
i) first 10 periods; ii) period 10-110; iii) long-run welfare; iv) total welfare
Index: 1 = welfare along the initial bgp
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Figure 6: Optimal policies and the public capital elasticity
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Figure 7: The optimal public investment/output ratio path
Optimal public investment/output ratio. Active and passive policy rule 
(Upsizing case, Public capital elasticity of 0.15)
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